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SOME REMARKS ON AID AGENCIES AMD 
DEPENDENCY IN THE SOUTHERN SUDAN. 
By K.K. Prah. 
ABSTRACT 
The aain objective of this paper is to show the general 
character of the iapact of aid, and the activities of aid agency 
workers, on Southern Sudanese society, since the Addis Ababa 
Agreenent of 1972, The author attempts to show, that the peculia 
rities of extreae undevelopaent and the relatively intensive aid 
activity have in this respect been relatively unique in Africa. 
The results have often tended to reinforce the structure of 
dependency in the Southern Sudan. Further, the growing civil war 
appears to be forcibly bringing to a close, aid activity in this 
region of the Sudan, 
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Introduction: Independence and Dependence. 
The euphoria of the early years of independence, the 
50s and 60s in Africa, have long fizzled out. Soon after those 
heady years, the reality of neocolonialism and dependency curbed 
the initial excitedent. Theoretically, it was a logical historical 
development since the essential character of the transformation 
from colonialism to post-colonialism, precluded any radical res-
tructuring of the -state. The economic relations between the old 
centres of capital resources, and the underdeveloped world have 
been largely inherited by a new elite who to some extent serve as 
local overseers of the interests of their former colonial over-
lords; ' The relationship is also sharply reflected on the cultural 
and social levels of the national and international lives of the 
people* 
Under colonialism, the development effort was the 
inspirational-preserve of the colonial power. Planning, develop-
ment work, and supervision was run through a bureaucracy largely 
led by colonial administrators. With independence these roles 
were assumed by the local elite aided by expatriates from a variety 
of donor countries. In some African countries, the presence and 
influence of expatriate aid workers is relatively limited. This 
is the case in Ghana or Nigeria. In others, like Botswana or the 
Southern Sudan, the social, economic, and cultural influence of 
the aid agencies, is considerable. Their activities and lifestyles 
tend often to reinforce neocolonial relations and attitudes, 
rather than weaken them. . Discussing specifically international 
medical aid, Turshen and Thebaucl have pointed out that the benefits 
which expatriate aid agency workers reap, • • > 
- range from prestige and enriched clinical 
experience.... to the higher standards of 
living abroad than they would enjoy at 
home and in countries where unemployment 
rates are rising escape from the rigors of 
competition for jobs in tight labour 
markets. Given their vested interests 
this group.,.militates against change 
in organizations like TOO. (l) 
IDS/WP 418 
The wide difference between the living standards of the aid agency 
worker and the local, tends to accentuate and amplify stereotyped 
inages. As has been correctly observed, many Africans associate 
whites with luxury, cars, a villa e.t.c. "They do not believe you 
if you behave differently" (2). On the other hand, J.P, Brug has 
rightly observed that development aid workers undergo fundamental 
changes in attitudes during their stay in underdeveloped countries. 
Often, their initially positive and open-minded attitude towards the 
locals, changes to racist and superior postures(3). There is 
generally a strong tendency for the expatriate community to absorb 
a now-comer, and assimilate the new arrival into the basic ideas 
of their enclave mentality. Those expatriates who struggle to es~ 
cope this subculture have as of necessity to develop some psychologi-
cal imperviousness to social control(4). 
The Southern Sudan 
The • Sudan is the largest country on the African con-
tinent, almost a million square miles of which over half is either 
desert or semi-desert. Its more vegetative part, the South, is 
also its more technologically baclorord part. The North is Arabised, 
and the South, African. Thus the difference between the North and 
the South does not lie only in the economic unevenness in the 
contemporary modes of production in these two parts of the country, 
but also in the cultural and national levels of social life. 
Historically, Arab dominance and slavery in the past,and contempo-
rary economic and national domination in the Sudan as a whole is 
reflected most sharply in the relations between North and South, 
although many African nationalities like the Beja, Fung, Pur, Nuba, 
and Nubians e.t.c., have national areas in the north . The 
Sudanese Arab minority, constituting about 38 per cent of the 
population together with most Africans in the North share one 
common attribute, the Islamic religion, the South being mainly 
Christian and Animist. Today, the .Sudan as a whole is in the 
periphery of global economic relations, further, the south is as it 
were, is the periphery within the Sudan. 
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For much of the 19th century, during tv/o successive 
regimes, the Turco-Egyptian Regime (1821»-1883) and the Mahdist 
Regime (1881-1898), the South was robbed constantly of human labour 
through slavery. Both humans and cattle were taken from the 
generally cattle-owning ethnicities of the area, so that, the 
human population of the South at the beginning of the Anglo-
Egyptien Condominium Rule (1898-1956) was only a fraction of 
what it had been 50 years before (6). Today,.the South provides 
relatively, a large measure of the construction, casual, and 
menial labour in the North. Conflict has for decodes characterised 
the relations between North and South, Arab and African, to the 
present period. The last major conflict between the two unevenly 
developed ports of the Sudan erupted from s&all beginnings in 1955, 
one year before independence. The war lasted 17 years and was ; 
finally brought;.to a close .with the Addis Ababa Agreement of 1972, 
During the War years, development in the South was naturally 
arrested while some measure of progress was made in the North. 
Thus by 1972 the South was relative to the North even more back-
ward than it had been;on the eve of independence. The Addis Ababa 
Agreement was universally welcomed, and various foreign groups 
and governments offered and pledged help to resuscitate the 
warshattered society of the South, The major task after the peace 
settlement was the repartriation of about 250,000 refugees. By 
the end of December 1972, the number of registered returnees were 
as follows(7). •:-.>. • 
Country of 
Refuge 
People Transported 
by the U.N.H.G.R. 
People Returned 
, Independently 
Uganda 17,600 11,900 
} 
• 18,000 Zaire • 8,000. 
Central African 
Republic 10,800 . 11,300 
Ethiopia 7,400 15,600 
Total 44,600 57,600 
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In addition to registered returnees, about 324000 returned to 
their homes from the sanctuaries in the bush(8)« By February, 
1973, the Special Fund created to meet the contingencies of 
repartriation and resettlement reflected the foilowing(9). 
Contributions (Sudanese Pound: s)[n Cash In Kind 
Local (National C-ovt. 
~ ~~ and other 
Sudanese bodies) 
External Aid (UN Agencies) 
(international 
Charities) 
(Friendly States) 
(Others) 
i 
783,210 
4,000 
' 126,800 
1,850,140 
6,316 , 
2,770,466 
3,794 
498,539 
584,472 
144,367 
1,236,172 
Further pledges in cash and kind to the Special Fund by the same 
date totalled about ten million Sudanese Pounds, of which neatly 
seventy five per cent was promised by the UN agencies, inter-
national charitable agencies and friendly states(io). The size 
of the problem, compounded by the weak infrastructure and a war-
shattered economy, dwarfed tke available aid. Virtually, the 
South was starting from scratch. It was the desparate plight of 
the South in the face of her daunting post-war problems of reconstruc-
tion which mode her particularly pliable, and opened her. up to the 
great assortment of aid agencies we find- in the Southern Sudan today; 
numbering about 50, It is doubtful if there is any state or region 
of a state in Africa today with such a proliferation of aid agencies. 
i . i 
Aid Agencies and the Southern Sudanese Economy 
i 
; The aid agencies are classified int.-- three groups; 
f 
multi-lateral organizations, bilateral organizations, and voluntary 
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» 
agencies* The multi-lateral organizations are dominated by the 
United Notions agencies i.e. the UNDP., UNHOR, PAQ, UNICEF, and 
the V/PP, In addition to these UN agencies, the World Bonk and the 
European Economic! Community also operate as multi-lateral bodies in 
the South Sudani In the case of multi-lateral and bilateral agencies 
the Sudanese central government direct* : where and which projects 
should be set up, • All the multilateral and bilateral agreements 
are negotiated with the central government. On the other hand, the
 1 
voluntary agencies sign their agreements directly with the regional 
authorities!. Bilateral assistance is undertaken by the "ODA, GTZ, 
USAID, the Dutch government» the Kuwaiti government, and the 
Belgian, governmenti. The voluntary agencies are the most numerous 
and are dominated by Christian, missionary organizations^ ,- These 
include., the Lutheran World Service, the Frankfort Zoological 
Society, the New York Zoological Society, the African Medical and 
Research Foundation, the Voluntary Service Group, the International 
Voluntary Service, Voluntary Service Overseas, " German Voluntary 
Service, the Action Coordination for the Reconstruction of the 
Southern Sudan (ACROSS), the Norwegian Church Aid, (NCA), the 
Sudan Council of Churches, the Norwegian Council for the"Prevention 
of Blindness, the German Leprosy Relief Association, the Sudan 
Interior Church Development Aid and its sister organization the 
Sudan Interior Mission, the ..Summer . Institute of Linguistics, the 
Seventh Day Adventis-t Church, the Swiss Inter-Church Aid, Euro- •• 
Action Accord, the Canadian Universities Students Organization, 
and tho.Juba Boatyard Project, 
For the most part-, these organizations. ore staffed by 
expatriates with only , the most junior and menial positions., such 
as petty clerks, messengers, radio operators,, some typists, drivers, 
cleaners e.t.c. earmarked for locals. Over the years these agencies 
have been running steadily, increasing budgets, the last of which 
appears as follows; 
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Budgets 1981 and 1 9 ' ( i n Sudanese Pounds I.S.P. =2US Dollars) 
1980 - • 1 1931 - 82 
Multilateral Organizations 10.237.380 20,220.793 
Bilateral Organization 0.565.074 21.1 7.710 
Voluntary Organizations 26,560,569 52.401,279 
TOTAL 46.063,031 93,609,782 
The extent and importance of aid funds to the Southern Region can 
be appreciated when compared to the Central Government Sponsored 
budget for the Southern Regional Government for the same period. 
Southern Region Recurrent and Development, Budgets 
1961 - 1982 (in Sudanese Pounds) (l2) 
PARTICULARS 1980 - 81 1981 - 82 
Recurrent Budget 62.416,000 84.510.000 
Development Budget 20.500.000 19.500.000 
TOTAL 82.216.000 104.010.000 
Thus for the 80-81 period aid funds to the South equalled 56$ of 
what the Central Government provided. In 81-82 it rose to' 30%. 
It is thus hardly surprising that a growing structure of dependency 
exists between the South and the donors. 
Aid funds are supposed to finance a wide variety of pro-
jects, including road maintenance, agricultural development and 
training,fisheries, boatbuilding, administrative skills, health 
projects, technical and University education, forestry, wildlife 
management etc. Sone limited measure of success has been achieved 
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on the Infra structural level, in the construction of clinics, 
schools, etc. But by and large, considering the funds involved, . < 
very much more could have been achieved in the 12 years of. aid . r.. 
since the Addis Ababa agreement. 
Instead of creating conditions of self-reliance and 
independence the activities of aid agencies have increased dependence. 
One of the'leadirig Southern Sudanese journalists remarked that: 
Clearly the nCA's 'contribution to development 
*'•
 0
 in the East Bank is a significant one. But it 
remains equally true that the province is 
becoming more and more dependent on the NCA with 
each four-year development period necessitating an 
»> NCA presence in the area 
THE AMIG-0 SYSTEM^
1 4
^ 
Why lias so little been achieved in a decade of such 
concentrated development aid? Some of the traditional answers to 
such questions are partly valid here. Some of the more immediate 
benefits of aid have gone more principally to the local elite in 
-the form of house rents and minor contracts for supplies and ser-
vices. But clearly in the South Sudan the often open and excessive 
squandering of foreign funds, as Is sometimes found in other coun-
tries of the underdeveloped world, is not- true here. The explana-
tion for this Is simple. The locals have little or practically 
no chance of getting their hands in' the till. As has been already 
pointed out, except for very minor officials the aid agencies in 
the-Southern Sudan are entirely in'the hands of expatriates.who 
supervise the funds and invite their selected book-keepers to moni-
(15) 
tor-the use of these funds
v
 ; .Whefttit comes to replacement of per-
sonnel or the award of consultancies their largely closed system 
of selection and operation, personal contacts and social network, 
are crucial factors in staff selection, A good example of this was 
observed by the author in 1982-83. A Swedish social worker 
sponsored by Christian organizations in Sweden and attached to the 
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Sudan C o u n c i l of Churches for work with refugees in the Sudan-
Uganda border area invited his brother, a forester, to the Sudan 
for ostensibly a holiday. Some weeks later the latter conveniently 
took over the brother's job in the Sudan Council of.Churches 
office in the regional capital Juba,.as the former's contract 
ended. 
The "jobs for the boys" mentality is pronouced among 
the agencies in the Southern Sudan. More often than not job 
openings are never properly advertised. Sometimes they are 
advertised only as a formality to satisfy rules and regulations. 
The real processes of selection and appointment are based more 
on the politics of friendship, than open and fair competition. 
As a result, many end up with highly paid jobs for which they are 
not necessarily suitably qualified. 
THE CONDITIONS OF SERVICES; 
Aid agencies in the Southern Sudan are offered a number 
of privileges by the Sudanese authorities in order to help and 
facilitate their operations. All their vehicles are imported tax-
free. On behalf of the aid agencies, the Regional Government pays 
taxes on office equipment, machinery, and fuel used by the agencies. 
This arrangement includes the understanding that in case of sale 
of any equipment by the agencies to a 3rd party, the latter pays 
the relevant tax on the equipment or vehicle. Personal vehicles 
are not exempt from taxes, but practically none of the agency per-
sonnel run personal vehicles. So that, in effect, all the agency 
officials use official vehicles for all purposes with free fuel 
provided by the particular agency, ' Agencies are not allowed to 
sell fuel, since this is imported tax-free. In actual fact a lot 
of the fi&l sold on the block inarket in Juba and other ports of 
the Southern Sudan is from agency stores. Fuel which was purchased 
by aid bodies in Kenya for 2 Sudanese pounds per gallon including 
transportation'in 1985, sold on the black market in Juba for 15-18 
Sudanese pounds per gallon^
1
^-* The absence of a good and effec-
tive electricity Supply system in the South has made the production 
of electricity for the consumption of aid agency workers in their 
residencies part of their daily operational costs. Here efforts 
of the individual agencies are expensively duplicated. Each agency 
operates its own generator or generator system on separate compounds, 
fenced and guarded. It has been estimated that in Juba.if these 
efforts for energy production were pooled, the capital costs could 
confortably find a comprehensive power-supply system.for the whole 
town^ '' Equipment used by the agencies are. not supposed to be 
sold. They are expected.to. be preferably; transferred to the regional 
authorities on.the completion of.the project undertaken by the 
agency involved. In September, .1983, the .NOA • sold a fleet of 
used Suzuki and Landrover vehicles, Alnost all the vehicles went 
to very highly placed politicians, security officers, and Southern, 
military brass; effectively keeping these elite elements happy, and 
cordially related tb the NCA.. 
Most ..of the agencies hold the bulk of their funds in. 
Nairobi. The supplies which flow in regularly include very, basic 
food items such as egg -s, tomatoes, carrots, cauliflower etc. 
The bigger agencies such as ACROSS, NCA,: and PDU, AMREP and others . 
maintain their own aircraft. Within the last year (1982-83), 
the USAID has built a compound of 4 houses.for their expatriate 
personnel at £593 per meter square, costing. 250,000 dollars 
each with all the internal fittings and
 ;
finish flown in from 
Europe^
8
^* This has been done out of a total USAID budget of 
6 million dollars over 3 years,lucrative salaries for the U.S. 
staff is also paid out of this allocation and its supposed also to 
account for their vehicles, maintenance, fuel etc. Precious . 
little is left over for development work, which benefits the ..,,. 
Southern Sudanese. During the Bona Hostage Incident of July 1983 
the USAID compound became the operational headquarters for the 
U.S. military mission-planning the assauTt "bn Bona to free the 
hostages on behalf of the 'Sudanese Government. • 
The construction of swimming pools is becoming fashionable 
among the agencies and these compounds stand fenced, humming with 
generators and in sharp contrast in affluence and development to 
the rest of the extreme poverty and misery of the country and 
society they are ostensibly helping to develop. In an area of the 
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world where the per capita income per head of the indigenous 
population is less than 90 dollars, it is interesting to note 
the hefty salaries and other remunerations which the personnel 
of the agencies supposed to be there to help them, get. Its 
been estimated that between 65 - 70$ of the funds voted for aid 
are actually spent in maintaining the expatriate staff. The PDU 
staff salaries world serve here as an example. The salary of the 
head of this agency is close to of $ 100,000 per year, the PDU 
a c c o u n t a n t gets $23,000,. the project anthropologist earns about 
$35,000. All these remunerations are paid tax free and there 
are additional perks like paid house and local leave, free trans-
port and fuel, duty-free liquor and other items. In 1982 the PDU 
brought in a consultant to run a month's course for a handful of 
storekeepers of the P.D.U. for which the appointee was paid 
$40,000. In 1983, 2 consultants were brought in to conduct a month!s 
course on management for about 20 people. They received $67,000 
for their 4 weeks service. In contrast to these rewards for the 
expatriate top echelons of the P.D.U, the most senior local staff 
receives $3,000 per year, in local currency... Generally what 
could be described as a conspiracy of silence is maintained-
regarding rewards and s v. remunerations. It is nrguettble thfat 
the U.S., the French, Dutch or British tax-payer is never told the 
truth about aid. The local authorities are also kept in the dork 
about the delicate and sensitive financial aspeots of their activi-
tives. In the Southern Sudan, GTZ- regulations clearly forbid 
discussion of salaries on the arguement that, each expert negotiates 
singly as it Were, from each according to this ability to each 
according to his need! Dutch estimates-suggest that an associate 
expert costs $30,000, an expert $50,000, and a volunteer $25,000 
(19) " 
per year.
x
 ' 
There is a distinct difference between the volunteers 
(VSO, Peace Corps, VNV), and the higher flying experts. Working' 
more closely and meaningfully with the local population, the 
volunteers in their lifestyles do not exhibit the same degree of 
extravagance which the experts display. One frequent allegation 
levelled against the aid agencies is that they generally prefer 
to recruit their own nationals; instead of locals. The PDU for 
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example has been known to employ expatriates as junior accoun-
tants, office clerks and. secretaries when locals cbuld *Lo these 
jobs. Again many of the expatriates in agency employ are 
barely qualified, and often lack experience for the jobs they 
hold. According to Albino Choi the P.D.U,, B.C.A., and ACROSS 
are the worst culprits, 
The operation 6f aircraft by some of the bigger organi-
zations has with it, stories about some of the illegal oargo of the 
personnel of these flights. Cold smuggling is not unknown among 
some agency expatriates, particularly in the Kapoeta area of 
(2) 
Eastern Equatoria . , 
SUBCULTURE M P CONTRACULTURE: 
Among agency elements the "spreading effect" idea is 
fairly prevalent and rather characteristic. Such aid agents, 
hope and believe that somehow their expensively capitalized lifestyle 
and the production units they create will catch on with the local 
population. Ripples of development and greater productivity will 
simply radiate from their operations. The.UCA director Per 
Westborg articulated this opinion by saying that: 
the whole idea of putting in resources 
is to create a certain momentum of 
development which can spark off 
(21) • 
further development in the arer. " 
This is not happening, A clergyman working in close association 
with ACROSS and the NCA bitterly described how one after the 
other clinics built in various parts of the South have functiona-
lly collapsed after they were handed over to the locals. While 
expatriates run these clinics, the inputs, drugs, vehicles, fuel,, 
and other equipment are available. The expatriates, as it were, 
practically leave with these logistics, living in fenced and 
technologically cushioned compounds, and guarded by watchmen, 
while earning salaries most of them could hardly earn at home, 
many become Cynical about what they are doing. 
~ 12 -
Torit, o town on the East Bonk of the Nile, serves os 
the headquarters of the NCA. The compound, built up to European-
standards of living in an area of backwardness, covers about 
5 square miles. It has all the amenities of western life, and 
has also a school running.up to secondary school level for the 
children of the Norwegian staff. The place is referred to by 
the locals as "Little Oslo". 
The Compagniede Construction Internationale or CCI, 
a contracted French-based multinational has been building the new 
Juba Airportrunway, and the controversial Jonglei Canal (to drain 
the swamps of the Sudd). These two projects have been largely 
financed by the European Development Fund, an EEC institution. 
Between them, these two projects are second only to Chevron in the 
Bentiu oilfields, in terms of investment capital in the South. 
The subculture of the CCI expatriates in their compounds on the 
Sobat River and at juba Airport, perhaps most glaringly illustrated 
the distance between expatriate and native lives; the geographically 
inextricable, but socially totally separated worlds of the two. 
groups. At the So bat River camp, on most days, French lac.les 
would be at the swimming pool sunning and paying attention to 
their lacquered fingers while natives waited on them with various 
beverages and other delicacies. Outside the camp, in its immediate 
vicinity, Shilluk tribesmen lived and. pr.r^ied on like they have 
done for centuries in their largely precapitalist cattle cultural 
complex. There is a well stocked boutique,, kindergarten, primary 
schools, and a canteen comparable in quality to a good European 
restaurant. They also boasted water-ski facilities, and on 
Sundays some went off on hunting expeditious. At the Juba Air-
port compound, there was even a specially imported French Chef, who... 
also served as hairdresser to the expatriates. At the Sobat, 6 .
 r 
months before the commencement of the project, prophalactics and a 
variety of drugs were widely distributed and administered in- the 
area among the native tribesmen in order to rid them as.much;.as 
possible of disease which could endanger French lives. 
Recently, operations on the Jonglei Canal, Juba Airport, 
and other activities o.f the multinationals: Chevron, Total Oil, 
and the CCI, have been forced to a halt, and the area evacuated, on 
account of the growing conflict in the South. 
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Armed Insurgency and Aid Agencies 
' The Peace of Addis Ababa held in the main for a decade, 
during which period, the aid agencies in the SD Southern Sudan pur-
sued their objectives with considerable equanimity and limited 
success* Hov/ever it should be pointed out that, already in 1975, 
on precisely the 3rd anniversary of the Addis Ababa agreement while 
Col. Gadafi of Libya was being conducted around the South as a 
guest of honour for the anniversary celebrations in Wau> a majc-r 
breakdown of the integration process of the former Anya Nya insur-
gents into the Sudanese army occured in Akobo. A large group of 
former African nationalist fighters fled into the bush as a result 
of the Akobo incident, and started a renewed armed campaign against 
the Arab dominated government. The renewed insurgency at this 
stage hardly affected the work of the aid agencies since the armed 
struggle was territorially, narrowly' restricted to the Akobo area 
close to the Ethiopian-Sudanese border. However, when in 1982-83, 
successively, the Numeiri administration ref-ivided., the South in 
negation of the spirit and letter of the Addis Ababa agreement, 
and subsequently went on to introduce'Sharia law, a spate of armed 
mutinies exploded in the South and accelerated the pace of events 
into the second civil war. 
With these developments, the activities of the aid agencies 
became increasingly difficult. Hostages were taken from among aid 
agency workers from time to time, from 1982 through into 1984. 
By the middle of 1983 contingency plans had been made by most aid 
agencies, in case matters seriously worsened necessitating evacua-
tion on short notice. Indeed on the 23rd May, 1983, the first 
Inter-Agency meeting was held to iron out these matters. By then, 
already the British VSO had'withdrawn its volunteers from the 
troubled Bor, Pibor'and Kangyor triangle. A month later towards 
the end of June the Bona hostage affair took place during which 
2 Americans, 1 Canadian, 1 West German, and a Dutchman all belonging 
to ACROSS were taken by a group calling itself the Southern Sudan 
Liberation Front,' This incident which captured the headlines in 
the international media sent alarm bells ringing. 
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Proa the statements and declarations made by the insurgents on 
various occa.sions, it was clear that the insurgents did not habour 
as such any ill intentions towards the aid workers. Their spoken 
objective was.,variously to draw international attention to their 
cause, raise ransoms, and generally proV6 that they were masters 
in the areas in which they operated. The increasing volume of the 
fighting and the uncertainties, arising thereof, induced many aid 
agencies to start phasing out their activities, while others 
transferred the running of their projects to the bigger groups, 
and withdrew most _cf their personnel. Early in 1984, the Patch 
withdrew most of their aid workers. Soon after that in May, the West 
Germans withdrew the bulk of their nationals after two of them had 
been taken hostage by SP1A forces in the Wau aroa. Other govern-
ments by now also gave serio^ls attention to similar courses of action. 
In September 1984, Ilumeiri rescinded the operation of 
Sharia-Law Courts, and agreed to, abrogate the redivision of the 
South* It is however doubtful if at the present stage these 
ostensibly conciliatory "gestures could holt the war. Por the aid 
agencies further escalation of the war would almost certainly mean 
a cessation of their activities, bringing to a close, a decade of 
aid efforts in the Southern Sudan, 
Closing Remarks 
< In retrospect, the balance sheet of development aid 
activity in the- South Sudan would most probably show a very limited, 
mainly infra structural developmental gains in the area. Most of 
this may appear to be, clinics, schools, housing and other accomo-
dational facilities which latter served mainly the expatriate 
workers. The lack of meaningful coordination and the inherent 
structure of dependency on which.these development activities 
have been carried out makes it fairly unlikely - that'most of 
these projects will.be in the near-future self-sustaining and 
self-reliant. Only a minor proportion of the funds earmarked for 
the .Southern Sudan during the last decade really sank into the 
ground for the long term good of the people of the Southern Sudan , 
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